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Abstract 
Since the Muslim Brotherhood rule was overthrown in 2013, Egypt’s largest Islamist organisation has 
been witnessing an internal debate over how to face the new regime: whether to continue its non-
violent political approach or to turn to violence to achieve its political goals. The majority of the 
movements’ members remain undecided, however. This policy paper seeks to look closely at the 
debate over the use of violence within the Muslim Brotherhood. Whose are the voices calling for 
violence and whose are those rejecting it? What is each group’s strategy to advance their respective 
approaches? And on which resources are they relying? What is the balance of power between the two 
groups, and is it likely to change in the future? The answers to these questions are expected to have a 
profound impact on stability in Egypt.  
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Executive Summary* 
The Muslim Brotherhood has been facing one of its most serious internal disputes since its 
establishment in 1929 with two Guidance Bureaus, the top executive body that formulates the policies 
of the organization, each claiming to be the legitimate authority.  
The debate over the use of violence represents one of the main points of disagreement between the 
two groups. The historical leadership led by Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy supreme guide, rejected any 
use of violence and insisted on non-violent methods as the only approach to be followed. However, the 
new leadership has adopted a more pragmatic approach that condones the use of violence under 
certain limits in order to weaken the current regime and drain its forces.  
Although the historical leadership has managed in recent years to restore its authority over most of 
the Brotherhood’s administrative offices across Egypt, the majority of the movement has been 
disappointed by the attitudes of the two groups and has decided to take a step back from the current 
struggle. 
There is little risk that the group calling for the use of violence within the Brotherhood will prevail. 
However, there is a risk that some of the Brotherhood youth might give up on the two camps 
altogether and join Salafi jihadi groups.  
The defection of members from the Muslim Brotherhood to Salafi Jihadi groups is a threat to both 
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite their current struggle, both the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood have interest in preventing the aggravation of this phenomenon.  
In order to prevent further radicalisation within the Brotherhood, both the regime and the 
movement need to consider a number of measures. First, the Brotherhood needs to find a compromise 
to end the current dispute between the two leaderships in order to re-establish the legitimacy of the 
Brotherhood in the eyes of its members. Second, the regime also needs to adopt a different strategy to 
isolate the violent branches of the Brotherhood from the wider movement. Finally, both the regime 
and the Brotherhood need to allow credible non-violent voices to meet and discuss with undecided 
groups in order to prevent them from joining the jihadi path, particularly those inside the prisons.  
  
                                                     
*
 The information and analysis presented here are drawn from the author’s fieldwork in Egypt from 2015 to 2017. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood after Rabaa al-Adawiya  
Over the past four decades, the Muslim Brotherhood has often insisted that it rejects the use of 
violence. It condemned the violent approach adopted by Jihadi groups in Egypt during the 1980s and 
1990s and insisted on a non-violent approach to change both the state and society. Even after the 
Muslim Brotherhood was ousted from power by the military in July 2013, the Brotherhood’s supreme 
guide, Mohammed Badie, stressed – in his famous speech at the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in to protest the 
military intervention – that “our revolution is peaceful and will remain peaceful. And our peacefulness 
is stronger than bullets”1. This intended to close the door on any calls to militarise the Brotherhood 
resisting strategy.  
Security forces forcefully dispersed the Brotherhood’s demonstrations in August 2013 pushing the 
Brotherhood to operate covertly under even worse conditions than before the 25 January 2011 popular 
uprising. This marked a new phase in the relation between the Brotherhood and state institutions 
where only the security approach prevailed. The new political regime declared the Brotherhood a 
terrorist organisation, dissolved its political party (Freedom and Justice, Al-huriya wa’l-‘adala), and 
froze the assets of more than 1,000 religious organisations and private sector companies, accusing 
them of being affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.  
In the second half of 2013, members of the Muslim Brotherhood continued to protest against the 
new political rule, in particular on university campuses at the beginning of the academic year 
2013/2014. In this phase, these members’ action was mainly inspired by the Shura council decision 
taken during the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in to follow a non-violent, creative approach to face the new 
regime. This approach insisted on non-violent means to resist the regime but condoned a limited level 
of violence within the frame of self-defense, which does not include bloodshed.  
However, by the end of 2013 as the regime was consolidating its power, some of the Muslim 
Brotherhood youth began to question the utility of this approach as a tool to face the regime. The idea 
of using violence to deter security forces surfaced among some of these youths and some took a quick 
decision to act without waiting for leadership approval. The third anniversary of the 25 January 
revolution witnessed some violent incidents that targeted security forces in Fayoum, Cairo, Alexandria 
and Giza.  
The majority of the Brotherhood leadership were either arrested or had to flee the country, creating 
a leadership vacuum. Some of the leaders who remained in Egypt worked clandestinely to fill this 
vacuum, as was the case with Mohammed Kamal, a member of the Guidance Bureau who took a de-
facto leading position during this period. To fill vacant positions, the Brotherhood held internal 
elections and promoted several of its young leaders to lead the Brotherhood’s activities on the ground. 
These changes amounted to the replacement of more than 65 percent of the organisation’s previous 
leadership
2
. In addition, an administrative committee tasked with running the brotherhood was 
approved by the movement’s Shura council in February 2014 under the leadership of Mohamed 
Kamal. The administrative committee established a new plan that was in line with the creative non-
violent approach. However, this plan was rejected by a large part of the youth on the ground; they 
refused to follow the same approach that caused no harm to the regime, despite the killing and arrest 
of thousands of movement members.  
                                                     
1
 The full Speech of Mohammed Badie, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brotherhood on 5 July 2013 is available in 
Arabic at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mAuHkmXDIxg [Accessed 5 February 2018].  
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 Interview with Ahmed Abdel Rahman (head of the Brotherhood’s administrative office abroad), Al-Jazeera channel, 22 
April 2015, Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/programs/withoutbounds/2015/4/16/ [Accessed 16 February 2018]. 
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The leadership dispute over the use of violence  
At the end of 2014, Mohammed Kamal proposed a new plan to escalate violent attacks, starting in 
January 2015 with the aim of reaching its peak within twelve months. The plan intended to pave the 
way for what he thought might be an opportunity to bring down the regime. The new leadership 
framed this strategy within an ideology based on a document called “The Jurisprudence of Popular 
Resistance to the Coup”, issued by a religious committee within the Brotherhood3.  
The document offers religious justification for the use of violence against security forces by 
underlining the religious concept of “Dafa’ al- Sa’el” or “Repelling the Assailant”, which according to 
this document, is an equivalent to the modern concept of the right to self-defense. This ideological 
framework insists on the wide range of degrees and choices between non-violence and full-armed 
confrontation. According to its religious approach, the assailant should be resisted in a gradual manner 
starting by the least costly measures (threatening/beating up). However, if only killing him would stop 
his assault, he can be killed. The authors of this document insist that it does not constitute a shift in the 
Muslim Brotherhood approach, but only a shift in its attitudes, which may change according to the 
circumstances as long as it remains within the religious limits. The document has also placed a number 
of limits on the use of violence, for example: The rejection to attack security officers that are not 
involved in attacking the protesters, as is the case with border control forces or road check points, as 
well as the families of police officers involved in violence against the protesters. This new ideological 
framework is distinct from the Salafi Jihadi ideology, which relies on the principle of takfir – the 
process of excommunication as the basis for the military struggle against state institutions to achieve 
Islamic governance. This new approach does not excommunicate members of the security forces and 
insists that they should be resisted not because of their faith but for their actions.  
However, the historical leadership both in Egypt and abroad interfered in order to put an end to this 
violent approach and accused Kamal of seeking to militarise the Muslim Brotherhood. Members of the 
historical leadership represented by Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy of the supreme guide, and Mahmoud 
Hussein, the secretary general, rejected Kamal’s new strategy to escalate violence and tried to reassert 
their control over the movement. Mahmoud Hussein issued a statement insisting that the Brotherhood 
operates with its apparatuses and institutions in accordance with the movement’s internal regulations 
and with members of the Guidance Bureau. The Brotherhood has supported its activities by providing 
a number of assistants, adhering to the movement’s regulations and the decisions of its institutions; 
accordingly, its deputy leader acts as a supreme guide [head of the organisation] until the supreme 
guide is released [from prison] God willing, and the Guidance Bureau is the one that manages the 
organisation. The historical leadership also rejected the document on popular resistance and refused to 
formally recognise the committee that drafted it. Mahmoud Hussein claimed that there is no 
committee within the Brotherhood that was tasked with the mission of writing such a document
4
. 
The previous historical leadership has insisted on its commitment to non-violent methods in facing 
the political regime in Egypt. Many of them would often quote the Brotherhood supreme guide 
Mohammed Badie’s sentence in his famous speech at the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in: “Our peacefulness 
is stronger than bullets”. Other Muslim Brotherhood figures also argued that the Muslim Brotherhood 
doctrine does not allow the use of violence. Among these figures is Mahmoud Ghozlan, member of the 
Guidance Bureau, who wrote an article in May 2015 stating that:  
“He who believes in the call of the Muslim Brotherhood must be committed to the general 
fundamentals of Islam, and on top of those, to the fundamentals of the Muslim Brotherhood, and 
should not deny or stray from them. These constants include: the need for teamwork, education as 
                                                     
3
 Interview with Magdy Shalash (member of the second administrative committee) on Mekamleen channel, 6 October 
2016.Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffxvHduo064 [Accessed 16 February 2018]. 
4
 Mahmoud Hussein, Rodoud A’la ba’d al-tasa’oulat (Answers to some questions), 9 February 2016, available online 
(Arabic) at: http://alamatonline.com/archives/7083 [Accessed 10 February 2018].  
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a means for change, peace and nonviolence as our chosen way, commitment to shura 
[consultation], the rejection of tyranny and individualism either within the group or outside, and a 
refusal to resorting to the takfir [excommunication] of Muslims.”
5
 
The historical leadership’s position was not only driven by ideological factors, but also by two further 
practical ones: first, pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood outside Egypt to renounce any level of 
violence in order to protect the international image of the Brotherhood as a non-violent movement, and 
second, the desire to prevent the new leadership from extending its control over the organisation. 
In order to decrease the level of tension between the two groups, Mohammed Kamal agreed to step 
down as leader of the administrative committee. In October 2015, the two camps agreed to form a 
second administrative committee directed by Mohammed Abdel Rahman, a member of the Guidance 
Bureau known for being close to the historical leadership. Mohammed Kamal kept his position as a 
mere member of this new committee. However, this attempt soon failed as Mohammed Abdel Rahman 
accused the committee of acting without consulting him, while the committee accused him of trying to 
block all its decisions without explanations.  
Throughout 2016, the historical leadership used its organisational skills to regain control over the 
administrative structure. On the one hand, the historical leadership formed an investigation committee 
that froze the membership of a number of key figures in the new leadership, including former Minister 
of International Cooperation Amr Derrag, former Investment Minister Yehia Hamed, and the head of 
the Brotherhood’s administrative office abroad, Ahmed Abdel Rahman. On the other hand, it 
promoted its own men to higher positions in order to control the various 27 administrative offices, the 
executive body of the movement tasked with implementing its plans on the governorate level. In 
addition, it played the financial card to put pressure on those who were supporting the new leadership 
strategy to renounce their support and plead allegiance to the historical leadership. As most of the 
movement’s assets in Egypt have been frozen, the movement depended mainly on its economic 
activities outside Egypt. These projects are only known and administrated to a few members of the 
Guidance Bureau that are aligned with the historical leadership. For example, the historical leadership 
refused to deliver money allocated to the families of imprisoned members of the administrative office 
in Alexandria as they considered it part of the Mohammed Kamal camp.  
In April 2016, Mahmoud Ezzat declared that the Shura council met and selected a new 
administrative committee. The new leadership refused to formally recognise the new committee. In 
May 2016, Mohammed Kamal announced his resignation in an audio message from his position as 
administrative committee member, and called upon all the administrative offices to be united, and to 
support the efforts to elect a new leadership. Five months later, security forces killed Kamal. In 
December 2016, the new leadership elected a temporary Guidance Bureau under the name of the 
General Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood. From its side, the historical leadership refused to 
recognise this new Guidance Bureau.  
Parallel to this leadership struggle, some Brotherhood members who were engaged in the limited 
violence activities had become disappointed by the two camps and established two armed groups 
outside the Brotherhood: Hassm (the Arabic for ‘determination’, and abbreviation for the ‘Movement 
of Egypt’s Forearms’) established in July 2016, and Lewaa al-Thawra (‘The Banner of the 
Revolution’), formed in August 2016. The two groups claimed responsibility for several operations 
targeting security forces, including the assassination of National Security Agency officer Ibrahim 
Azazy in July 2017 and the assassination of Brigadier General Adel Ragaie, a senior officer in the 
armed forces in October 2016. These groups also targeted figures who did not belong to the security 
forces, as occurred with the attempt to assassinate former Mufti of Egypt Ali Gomaa in August 2016.  
                                                     
5
 Mahmoud Ghouzlan (member of the Guidance Bureau of the Muslim Brotherhood), on the 87th anniversary of the 
establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood our call is persisting and our revolution is progressing, 22 May 2015, available 
online (Arabic) at: https://old.egyptwindow.net/Article_Details.aspx?News_ID=80417 [Accessed 16 February 2018]. 
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Currently, as a result of these struggles, three main groups stemming from the Brotherhood can be 
identified: first, the historical leadership camp that has managed to restore its control over most of the 
administrative offices; second, the new leadership now known as ‘the General Bureau’; and third, the 
armed groups such as Hassm and Lewaa al-Thawra. 
The debate among the Muslim Brotherhood’s grassroots: to take up arms or not? 
The struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood’s two leaderships over the use of violence has also 
been reflected in the debate among its grassroots. In addressing questions over using violence against 
security forces, the debate among the grassroots has revolved around two main questions. The first is 
ideological: is it religiously permissible? And the second is more rational: would it achieve its goal of 
bringing down the regime?  
Ideologically, the rejection of violence marks the ideational frame of the Muslim Brotherhood as it 
has been institutionalised over the past four decades. While a debate exists over whether the 
ideological frame of the Muslim Brotherhood condones the use of violence or not, since the 1970s the 
Brotherhood has preached against the Jihadi groups’ approach of using violence to achieve their 
political goals. Moreover, it has institutionalised these ideas into its membership rules. 
Excommunication and the use of violence were the main two issues according to which one can 
become a regular member of the Brotherhood or not. There were clear orders to not promote any 
sympathiser to the level of official member if there were any doubts over his views on these two 
issues. Although Mohammad Kamal and his group developed a new ideological frame to justify the 
use of violence under certain conditions, the historical leadership’s rejection of the document has left a 
large part of the Muslim Brotherhood grassroots unsure about this ideological justification, as it 
contradicts their previous religious formation within the Brotherhood including the strict hierarchy 
when it comes to receiving orders. 
In a rational manner, the cost/benefit analysis of taking up arms has also been discussed. While a 
large part of the Muslim Brotherhood youth refused to protest in places where they can easily be 
arrested or even killed, another part of the movement’s rank-and-file members doubted the idea that 
using violence against Egyptian state institutions would destabilise the political regime: for many of 
them, it might only push it towards a more violent approach. They believe that being dragged into 
military confrontation with the regime would only mark the end of the movement. They would often 
highlight the experience of Islamist groups that tried to challenge the Mubarak regime in the 1980s 
and 1990s, such as Jama’a Islamiya and Al-Jihad, which ended in military defeat for both groups. The 
Jama’a Islamiya revised its entire religious approach and renounced the use of violence in its famous 
ideological revisions that started with its call to stop violence in 1997. The experience of other Islamist 
movements outside Egypt has also framed some of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s choices, such 
as the confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian regime in 1980s, during which 
the Syrian regime violently defeated the movement. In addition, many members believe that their 
leadership’s lack of support makes the cost of using violence much higher than its benefits. The lack 
of support from the leadership also implied a lack of financial support, which goes beyond the supply 
of the arms and materials required to also include support for the families of the victims or imprisoned 
members who will decide to use violence. The historical leadership has threatened to cut funds for the 
families of prisoners who will engage in violent activities. As a result, being unsure of the ideological 
justification for the use of violence, and doubting the benefits that it might bring, a large part of the 
Muslim Brotherhood youth has decided to take a step back from the current debate. They came to the 
conclusion that the two strategies proposed by the two leaderships, either protesting peacefully or 
using violence, will not achieve the goal of bringing down the regime. 
However, this does not seem to be the case for a part of the Muslim Brotherhood youth who were 
jailed after 2013. In this case, these youth are less likely to follow the path of groups like Hassm, but 
they might drop out the Muslim Brotherhood altogether and join Salafi Jihadism, like the self-
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proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Testimonies from prisons show that the percentage of Muslim 
Brotherhood members who became more willing to join Salafi jihadi groups while in jail rose to more 
than 20 percent of the detainees.  
Unlike the majority of the Muslim Brotherhood grassroots, this group of youth seems to have 
different answers to both the ideological and rational questions.  
With regard to the ideational factor, a large part of this group joined the Brotherhood after 2011, 
when the movement was focusing on the political struggle of the transitional period and paid little 
attention to the religious formation of the newly joining members. Hence, these youths did not follow 
the same religious formation, stressing the rejection of using violence. In addition, because many of 
them currently share prisons with Jihadi prisoners, they are exposed to Jihadi ideology, which offers a 
strong ideational frame to the practice of violence. One Egyptian newspaper called one of the prisons 
“a governmental centre to recruit members for IS”6. 
As for the cost/benefit question, members of this group dropped out of education and they believe 
they no longer have a future even if released from prison. This makes the cost of turning to violence 
much cheaper for them, even if it does not lead to the collapse of the regime.  
How to prevent radicalisation within the Brotherhood? 
The Muslim Brotherhood has experienced one of its most serious internal disputes since its 
establishment in 1929, with two Guidance Bureaus each claiming to be the legitimate authority. The 
debate over the use of violence represented one of the main points of disagreement between the two 
groups. On the one hand, the historical leadership led by Mahmoud Ezzat rejected any use of violence 
and insisted on peaceful methods as the only approach to be followed. On the other, the new 
leadership adopted a more pragmatic approach that permits the use of violence within certain limits in 
order to weaken the current regime and drain its forces. Although the historical leadership has 
managed in recent years to restore its authority over most of the Brotherhood administrative offices all 
over Egypt, the majority of the movement has been disappointed by the attitudes of the two groups and 
has decided to take a step back from the current struggle.  
There is little risk that the group calling for the use of violence within the Brotherhood will prevail. 
Even groups like Hassm and Lewaa al-Thawra do not involve more than a few hundred members. 
However, there is a risk that some of the Brotherhood youth might give up on the two camps 
altogether and join Salafi jihadi groups, particularly with the growing popularity of Jihadi figures such 
Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani (the head of the Syrian militant group Tahrir al-Sham, previously al-
Nusra Front) among the Muslim Brotherhood’s youth. Al-Jawlani has already called on the Muslim 
Brotherhood to abandon its non-violent ways and bear arms. This pattern has been clear inside 
Egyptian prisons, where many Brotherhood members could meet and exchange ideas with Salafi jihadi 
prisoners. 
The defection of members from the Muslim Brotherhood to join Salafi Jihadi groups is a threat to 
both the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite their current struggle, both the regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood have interest in preventing the aggravation of this phenomenon. For the 
Brotherhood, Salafi Jihadism is a challenge to both its ideology and its organisation. Ideologically, IS 
accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of being apostate, and organisationally, they are calling upon their 
youth to join their ranks. For the regime, IS’s growing presence in Sinai represents the main security 
challenge to both police and the military.  
                                                     
6
 Mohamed Khayal, Hona Toura: Markaz Hikoumi li-tajnid al-dawa’sh (“Here is Torah: a governmental centre to recruit 
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In order to address this threat, both the regime and the Brotherhood could consider a number of 
measures. First, the Brotherhood needs to find a compromise to end the current dispute between the 
two leaderships in order to re-establish the legitimacy of the Brotherhood in the eyes of its members. 
Second, the regime needs to also adopt a different strategy to isolate the violent branches of the 
Brotherhood from the wider movement. Finally, both the regime and the Brotherhood should allow 
credible non-violent voices to meet and discuss with undecided groups in order to prevent them from 
joining the jihadi path, particularly those inside the prisons 
Bridging the gap between the two camps within the Muslim Brotherhood 
The current struggle over Brotherhood leadership has left many of the movement’s members lost. The 
failure of the two competing camps to reach an agreement over the leadership of Egypt’s largest 
Islamic movement, in addition to their inability to offer a clear political strategy, has left many of its 
youth vulnerable to the Salafi Jihadi propaganda, particularly those inside the prisons. If the leadership 
is to regain its legitimacy, a starting point should be to encourage dialogue between the divided 
leadership to end this struggle and agree on a common frame to lead the movement during this phase. 
In the past, some religious figures from both inside and outside the Muslim Brotherhood sought to 
bridge the gap between these two groups. This has been the case with Yusuf al-Qaradawi, chair of the 
International Union of Muslim Scholars, who in January 2016 called for both leaderships to take a step 
back and allow for a new election to take place. His attempt failed on that occasion, but the growing 
concern over the disappointment among the grassroots might make a new attempt at reconciliation 
easier to succeed.  
Strengthen credible non-violent voices within the Brotherhood 
Youths who are either practicing violence or supporting it have lost faith in many Muslim 
Brotherhood figures, in particular those who have been engaged in the struggle for leadership. Even if 
voices like Mahmoud Hussein or Mahmoud Ezzat are preaching for non-violence, they do not have 
enough credibility, if any, to convince those youth groups who are supporting or practicing violence to 
renounce it. On the other hand, these groups hold great respect for other Muslim Brotherhood figures 
who are known for their revolutionary positions within the Brotherhood. Such was the case with 
Mohammed Al-Beltagi, one of the few leaders who stayed at the Rabaa al-Adawiya sit-in during the 
security operation to end it, despite losing his daughter that day. Unlike other leaders of the 
Brotherhood, Al-Beltagi who is currently in prison, is often referred to by the angry Muslim 
Brotherhood youths as one of the voices they can listen to. Both the Muslim Brotherhood leadership 
and the Egyptian regime have interest in strengthening these credible non-violent voices by allowing 
these actors the freedom to meet and convince the Muslim Brotherhood youth that a violent path is not 
the answer.  
Adopting new policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
In order to face the wave of violent Islamist movements in the 1980s and 1990s, the Mubarak regime 
used what Robert Bianchi termed a policy of “selective tolerance”7. According to the term, the regime 
authorised its security forces to deal harshly with militant Islamic groups, while permitting non-violent 
Islamic groups and associations to expand their presence in Egyptian public life. By adopting this 
approach, the regime managed to isolate violent groups from the larger Islamist spectrum, which made 
it easier for the regime to defeat it.  
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 Bianchi, R. (1989). Unruly corporatism: associational life in twentieth-century Egypt. New York: Oxford University 
Press, p.200.  
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It is in the current Egyptian regime’s interest to learn from this strategy. Treating the Muslim 
Brotherhood with all its members as a terrorist organisation will only encourage undecided individuals 
to join the violent branch. Alternatively, the regime needs to offer greater incentives for the grassroots 
to join the non-violent branch within the brotherhood. These incentives could begin with 
improvements to their conditions inside the prisons for the duration of their sentence and granting 
them access to the public sphere through either religious or political activities.  
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